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A PERSPECTIVE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES
RESTRUCTURING
Richard M. Whiting*
Banking is a very heavily regulated segment of the financial services indus-
try. Such governmental oversight flows from the special nature of banks
within the United States economic system.' Consequently, bankers have op-
erated under statutorily imposed limitations on many aspects of their busi-
ness, including, inter alia, the lines of products and services that they may
offer' and the location of their operations.3 These laws are premised upon
certain assumptions and policy decisions regarding the business of banking.
Changes in the business of banking, in the financial services industry, and
in the domestic and international marketplace have affected some of the as-
sumptions and policies underlying this country's system of financial service
and banking laws.4 As a result, many of these laws, some of which are over
fifty-years old, have become ineffective or irrelevant. It is reasonable, there-
fore, that consideration now be given to comprehensive reform of our cur-
rent statutory framework.
Gradually becoming aware of the necessity for legislative change, Con-
gress has deliberated upon, and more recently has enacted, banking legisla-
tion. Unfortunately, to date such laws have been narrowly focused and do
not address the fundamental questions raised by evolving conditions. How-
ever, in title II of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987,' Congress
stated:
It is the intent of the Congress, through the Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the Committee
on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs of the House of Represen-
* General Counsel, Association of Bank Holding Companies, Washington, D.C.; J.D.,
Boston College Law School. Former law clerk to the Honorable Albert V. Bryan, United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Richmond, Va.; Senior Attorney, Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, D.C.
1. For a discussion of the special nature of the role of commercial banks in the United
States economy, see generally Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, 1982 FED. RESERVE BANK OF
MINNEAPOLIS ANN. REP. 5.
2. See infra notes 18-66 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 90-131 and accompanying text.
5. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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tatives, to conduct a comprehensive review of our banking and fi-
nancial laws and to make decisions on the need for financial
restructuring legislation in the light of today's changing financial
environment both domestic and international before the expiration
of such moratorium.6
As the moratorium referred to in this provision expired on March 1, 1988, 7
it is obvious that Congress committed itself to an ambitious undertaking.
A distinguishing feature of the democratic legislative process is its encour-
agement and tolerance of the competition of ideas. This factor definitely
operates in the development by various parties of plans to aid Congress in its
self-appointed task of restructuring the financial services industry. A pleth-
ora of plans and recommendations has been proposed;' more are expected.
Each plan is different depending upon the drafter's conception of the issues,
his resolution of key policy questions, and his assessment of the practicality
of the available options.
The purpose of this Article is manifold. First, it will provide a brief intro-
duction to the nature of existing statutory provisions affecting the banking
industry, particularly those provisions dealing with limitations on permissi-
ble product and service lines and geographic restrictions. Second, the princi-
pal policy considerations underlying these laws will be described. Third, the
changes necessitating revision of the current framework governing the finan-
cial services industry will be reviewed. Fourth, a summary description of
the most prominent restructuring plans will be provided. Fifth, this Article
will contrast and compare the restructuring plan proposed by the Associa-
tion of Bank Holding Companies (ABHC) to several of the other plans. Fi-
nally, based upon the preceding analysis, some conclusions and
recommendations will be suggested to assist Congress and others in the pro-
cess of addressing reform of the banking system.
I. EXISTING STATUTORY AND REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
Commercial banks' must be chartered either by the federal government,
through the authority of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC),1 ° or by one of the states.'" Commercial banks may also choose
6. Id. § 203(a), 101 Stat. at 584.
7. Id. § 201(a), 101 Stat. at 581.
8. See infra notes 132-224 and accompanying text.
9. Commercial banks generally perform the functions of receiving deposits of money,
making loans, engaging in trust services, issuing letters of credit, accepting and paying drafts,
renting safe deposit boxes, and engaging in similar activities. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 245
(5th ed. 1979). These are to be distinguished from investment banks, thrifts, and other similar
institutions.
10. 12 U.S.C. §§ 26-27 (1982).
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whether to have their deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), by another fund, or not at all.12 Approximately 95%
of the nation's 15,000 commercial banks have opted for federal deposit in-
surance. 3 Additionally, commercial banks may choose whether to become
members of the Federal Reserve System."4 Finally, commercial banks may
be owned by a parent company, generally subject to the provisions of the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA),15 or they may be indepen-
dently owned by individuals and not by a regulated corporate entity. Ap-
proximately 9,750, or over 65% of the nation's commercial banks have
chosen the bank holding company form of ownership. 16 The decision by
management with respect to each of these various strategic options subjects
their banking organization to a kaleidoscope of overlapping, burdensome,
and confusing regulations..
A. Dual Banking System
The opportunity for America's bankers to choose either a national or state
charter creates the basis for the dual banking system. On one hand, the
existence of two separate, but interrelated, banking systems increases the op-
tions for innovation and preserves states' rights. On the other hand, the dual
banking system allows for the development of competing and sometimes
conflicting standards at the expense of a uniform national policy on banking
issues. Where the federal government has a legitimate interest, however,
Congress may exercise its authority to override state banking laws. 7 Where
Congress does not take preemptive action, state law generally controls. The
consequences of this bifurcated system of banking laws are no more perplex-
ing than in the area of ascertaining the precise scope of permissible product
and service lines available to the banking industry.
11. See generally id. § 214(a).
12. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, DEPOSIT INSURANCE IN A CHANG-
ING ENVIRONMENT G-7 (Apr. 15, 1983).
13. 1986 FDIC ANN. REPORT 3 (1987).
14. G. GOLEMBE, FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANKING 8 (2d ed. 1983).
15. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). All corporations, partnerships,
trusts or other companies that own or control a bank must register with the Federal Reserve
Board (Board) pursuant to the Act, and must otherwise comply with its provisions. Id.
§ 1844.
16. ASSOCIATION OF BANK HOLDING Co., BANK HOLDING COMPANY FACTS (Spring,
1987).
17. This authority stems from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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B. National Bank Product and Service Lines
As a creature of federal law, national banks may offer only those product
and service lines authorized explicitly or implicitly by Congress. Various
provisions of federal statutes enumerate express powers, which include lend-
ing money,18 accepting deposits," acting as fiduciary,2 and engaging in lim-
ited securities," real estate,22 and insurance activities. Alternatively,
implied powers derive from interpretation of section 24 of title 12 of the
United States Code by the Comptroller of the Currency, subject to judicial
review."4 That provision states that national banks may exercise "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing."" Regulatory construction of the "incidental powers" clause has re-
sulted in a "creeping" expansion of permissible activities, including the sale
or underwriting of title insurance26 and the issuance of mortgage-backed se-
curities. 27 Other than the Glass-Steagall considerations discussed below,
there appear to be no other applicable statutory limitations, by virtue of
membership in the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, the Federal Reserve
System or a holding company system, on the product and service lines avail-
able to a national bank.
C. The Glass-Steagall Act
The activities of national banks are subject to one major limitation: statu-
torily circumscribed involvement in investment banking. The provisions of
the Banking Act of 1933,28 four sections of which are collectively referred to
as the Glass-Steagall Act,29 contain this restriction. Together, these sections
separate commercial banking from investment banking. Section 16 of Glass-
18. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
19. Id.
20. Id. § 92a(a).
21. Id. § 24(Seventh).
22. Id. § 92a.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 24(Seventh).
25. Id.
26. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 377, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,601
(Feb. 6, 1987).
27. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 378, [Current] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,602
(Apr. 24, 1987).
28. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
29. "The popular name of the Act, Glass-Steagall, is derived from the names of the origi-
nal bill's sponsors, Senator Carter Glass and Congressman Henry Steagall." Hawke, The
Glass-Steagall Legacy: A Historical Perspective, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 255, 255 n.1 (1986);
see also Clark & Saunders, Glass-Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks, Capital Markets, and
the Small Investor, 97 BANKING L.J. 811, 811 n.l (1980).
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Steagall limits the express powers of a national bank to purchase and sell
securities upon the order and for the account of its customers, deal and un-
derwrite in certain United States government and state general obligations,
and purchase for its own account and subject to limitations certain invest-
ment securities, other than corporate stock.3 ° Section 20 prohibits all mem-
ber banks from affiliating with any company "engaged principally" in
prohibited securities activities.3 1 Section 21 bars any person or company
engaged in prohibited securities activities from also receiving deposits sub-
ject to check or payment upon demand.3 2 Finally, section 32 of Glass-Stea-
gall prohibits interlocking officer, director, and employee positions between
member banks and firms "primarily engaged" in investment banking
activities.3"
D. State Bank Product and Service Lines
State banks, the other type of banks within the dual banking system, de-
rive their authority to offer products and services, expand geographically,
and generally conduct their business from state statute, regulation, or inter-
pretation.3 4 Federal limitations may also apply to these institutions.3 5
Although the states have been conservative in the authorization of products
and services by confining their institutions to traditional banking business
lines, that policy currently is changing. 36 A recent study by the FDIC, for
example, indicates that the states increasingly have permitted their banks to
enter into new product lines, including insurance, real estate, and securities
activities.3 7 In the area of securities activities, however, a few states continue
to have in effect "mini-Glass-Steagall" statutes-state statutes modeled after
the federal law prohibiting bank investment banking activities.38
The authority of the state to increase the product lines and services avail-
30. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh).
31. Id. § 377.
32. Id. § 378.
33. Id. § 78.
34. See generally Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regula-
tion, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977).
35. For example, the provisions of § 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act are applicable to state
member banks. 12 U.S.C. § 335.
36. Perhaps frustrated by the inability to receive additional product and service authority
under the federal scheme, bankers have lobbied to obtain such powers from their state legisla-
tures. See Whiting, New Path Needed for Financial Service Industry, Am. Banker, June 25,
1987, at 4, col. 1.
37. See Saulsbury, State Banking Powers: Where are We Now?, REGULATORY REV. 1
(Mar.-Apr. 1987).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 103(a), 130 (McKinney 1971 & Supp. 1988).
1988]
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able to state-chartered banks is also subject to federal limitation.39 First, the
Glass-Steagall restrictions on the securities activities of state banks may ap-
ply, depending upon whether the bank is a member of the Federal Reserve
System.4' Second, it is arguable that the Federal Reserve Board (Board)
may impose activity limitations on state banks that choose to become a
member of, or to continue membership in, the Federal Reserve System.41
Third, while the FDIC is not a chartering authority and, therefore, may not
authorize activities, it has utilized its regulatory authority under section
1819(10) of title 12 of the United States Code42 to ensure that state-author-
ized powers are not exercised in a manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.4' As a result, insured banks may con-
duct essentially riskless activities, such as those involving securities, insur-
ance, and travel, directly in the state bank, while more risky activities
involving securities, real estate, and insurance underwriting must be con-
ducted in a separate subsidiary and subjected to various other procedural
requirements in order to continue to qualify for federal deposit insurance
coverage."
As a fourth federal limitation on state-chartered banks, the Board increas-
ingly has invoked its authority in the applications process, or the threat of
that authority, to limit, pursuant to the BHCA, product and service lines
granted by the charterer. 45 For example, the Board used its authority under
section 5(c) of the BHCA 46 to deny the application by Citicorp to acquire a
small state bank in South Dakota that was authorized to sell, underwrite,
and export from South Dakota a broad range of insurance products and
services.47 The Board held that this proposal constituted an evasion of the
39. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
41. In considering applications for membership into the Federal Reserve System, the
Board is empowered to consider "whether or not the corporate powers [of the applicant bank]
are consistent with the purposes of this Act." 12 U.S.C. § 322. The Board could attempt to
invoke this authority to regulate pursuant to § 208.7(a)(i) of Regulation H, 12 C.F.R.
§ 208.7(a)(1) (1987) to limit any changes in the general character of the bank's business, such
as the conduct of real estate activities, after becoming a member of the Federal Reserve
System.
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1819(10) (1982 & Supp. 1986).
43. 52 Fed. Reg. 23,963 (1985).
44. Id.
45. In connection with applications by bank holding companies to acquire bank subsidiar-
ies pursuant to § 3 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA), the Board may at-
tempt to utilize the factors listed in § 3 regarding financial considerations to limit the
nonbanking activities conducted by the bank to be acquired. 52 Fed. Reg. 42,301 (1987).
46. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
47. 71 Fed. Res. Bull. 789 (1985).
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purposes of the BHCA.4" Further, the Board has intimated that while the
nonbanking limitations of section 4 of the BHCA 49 do not apply to the state-
authorized activities that banks directly conduct, 50 it may apply such limita-
tions to activities that state bank subsidiaries indirectly conduct.5 ' The im-
pact of such an action, at a minimum, would be the federalization of the
activities indirectly conducted by state banks and, consequently, a limitation
on the bank's chartering authority.
E. Bank Holding Company Product and Service Lines
While bank holding companies are incorporated by the states, enactment
by Congress in 1956 of the BHCA,52 and its subsequent amendment in
1966, 53 1970,54 and 1982," ratified the judgment that the parents and affili-
ates of banks also should be subject to extensive federal regulation. The
Board is empowered to administer the BHCA and, in order to implement its
authority, the Board has promulgated Regulation y.5 6 Presumably, section
7 of the BHCA reserves to the states the right to regulate banks, bank hold-
ing companies, and subsidiaries thereof,57 to the extent that state action
would not contradict federal law.
Section 3 of the BHCA5 ' establishes standards and procedures for the
acquisition of banks by bank holding companies. The section does not, how-
ever, purport to place any activity limitation on the banks to be acquired.
48. Id. at 791.
49. 12 U.S.C. § 1843. The provisions of the BHCA are separated into various sections.
Section 3 governs bank holding company acquisition of banks and contains a list of factors to
be considered by the Board in acting on such applications. Noticeably absent from this section
is the mention of limitations on the activities of banks to be acquired. Id. § 1842. Section 4 of
the BHCA relates to the acquisition of nonbanks by bank holding companies and contains
specific limitations on the activity limitations of those nonbanks. Id. § 1843. At the current
time, there is some dispute regarding the applicability of the activity limitations contained in
§ 4 to the activities directly or indirectly conducted by banks acquired by bank holding
companies.
50. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 876 (1987).
51. See 52 Fed. Reg. 548-49 (1987) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 25) (proposed Jan. 7,
1987).
52. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
53. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843, 1848-1849 (1982)).
54. Act of Dec. 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843, 1849, 1850 (1982)).
55. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843, 1847 (1982)).
56. 12 C.F.R. § 225 (1987).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982).
58. 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
1988]
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As will be discussed below, however, section 3(d) of the BHCA places geo-
graphic limitations on bank acquisitions by bank holding companies. 59
Section 4 of the BHCA 6 prohibits bank holding companies from engag-
ing in, or owning shares of companies engaged in, businesses other than
banking, with several exceptions. The most important exception from this
prohibition is contained in section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA,6 1 which permits
bank holding companies to engage in any activity that the Board determines
by order or regulation to be so "closely related" to banking as to be "a
proper incident" thereto. The "proper incident" test requires balancing the
expected public benefits against the possible adverse effects associated with a
specific proposal by a particular bank holding company.62 The former of
these two tests, the "closely related" test, is based upon the Board's judg-
ment that the proposed activity meets certain criteria deemed generally to be
permissible for bank holding companies.63
To date, the Board has found twenty-four specific activities to be permissi-
ble by regulation"4 and another twenty-five permissible by order.65 These
include a broad range of activities, including mortgage banking, data
processing, and operating a finance or trust company. The Board is pre-
cluded, however, from exercising its discretion under the "closely related"
test in determining that insurance agency and underwriting activities are
permissible for bank holding companies.66
59. Id. § 1842(d).
60. Id. § 1843.
61. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
62. Every court that has considered the issue has endorsed this two-tiered test. See, e.g.,
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 213-16
(1984).
63. See National Courier Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d
1229, 1237-38 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
64. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.25(b)(1)-(24) (1987).
65. Golembe Associates, Inc., XXXVII BANK EXPANSION Q. 25-26 (2d Qtr. 1987).
66. Title VI of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, 96 Stat. 1469, 1536-38 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982)), amended § 4(c)(8) of
the BHCA by declaring that such insurance activities generally are not "closely related" to
banking, unless subject to one of seven specific exceptions. These exceptions are listed at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G). Many of these exceptions have been construed by the Board in
the context of amendments to Regulation Y or in acting on particular bank holding company
applications and are the subject of litigation. See, e.g., Independent Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board
of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Nos. 86-1572, 86-1573, 86-1576 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 24,
1986). In this last regard, the insurance industry seeks either a judicial or congressional state-
ment that the limitations on insurance activities contained in title VI apply equally to all bank
holding company subsidiaries, whether they be nonbanking, banking, or operating subsidiaries
within a holding company system.
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F Geographic Restrictions
Federal and state statutes reflect and enforce the historic notion that bank-
ing is a local business. State law governs geographic expansion by state
banks. The states' treatment of intrastate expansion through branching and
placement of automated teller machine facilities generally may be character-
ized as diverse and changing from a policy of tight restriction to a more
liberal allowance of in-state expansion. The latest profile of state branching
laws indicates that twenty-three states and the District of Columbia permit
state-wide branching,67 twenty-one allow limited branching within the
state,68 and seven are unit branching states, wherein branching is not permit-
ted.6 9 In addition, Mississippi prohibits multibank holding companies,
thereby limiting a banking organization only to the intrastate geographic
opportunities available under state branching laws.7" Finally, while there
exists no federal prohibition on interstate expansion by state banks, no states
actively encourage this method of expansion.71
National bank expansion by branching is governed by the provisions of
the McFadden Act.7 2 Based upon deference of federal to state law and the
concept of competitive equality between state and national banks, this 1927
law provides equality for national banks to branch within a state to the same
extent allowable to a state bank.7 3 The McFadden Act also prohibits a na-
tional bank from branching outside the state where it is located.74 Due to
interpretations of the term "branch" as used in the McFadden Act, certain
offices or facilities of national banks may constitute branches for purposes of
the McFadden Act, at the same time that identical state bank offices and
facilities may escape that definition under applicable state law.75
Finally, bank holding company parents are subject to certain federal re-
strictions on geographic expansion. 76 While bank holding companies gener-
ally may acquire multiple banks within the state in which they are located,
they may acquire additional banks in states other than where they are lo-
67. THE CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-
CHARTERED BANKING 83 (1lth ed. 1986).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 96.
71. See Miller, Interstate Branching and the Constitution, 41 Bus. LAW. 337 (1986).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
73. This theory is explained in First Nat'l Bank v. Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122, 130-34
(1969).
74. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c).
75. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, BANKING LAW 115-18 (2d ed. 1984).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The nonbanking subsidiaries of bank
holding companies are not subject to any geographic restrictions. Id,
19881
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cated only pursuant to the provisions of section 3(d) of the BHCA.77 This
provision, also known as the Douglas Amendment, allows interstate bank
acquisitions by bank holding companies only if the state in which the target
bank is located explicitly authorizes the acquisition.78
Until the early 1980's, few states allowed acquisition of their banks by out-
of-state holding companies. 79 Gradually, however, certain states lowered
their barriers to acquisition in various ways. Some states allowed acquisition
of their banks by holding companies located in particular regions of the
country, while others opened their banks to acquisition on a national basis."0
The former type of statute, known as a regional compact, has survived a
constitutional challenge alleging that their exclusionary nature violated the
equal protection clause."1 Additionally, some of these statutes impose a reci-
procity requirement, while others do not. Currently, therefore, some states
permit acquisition of their banks only by procurers located in certain re-
gions, while other states have adopted a policy of full interstate banking.
Certainly, with nine states having endorsed full interstate banking and fifteen
states having adopted regional compacts with national triggers, the trend is
towards a uniform national policy on interstate acquisition by bank holding
companies.
G. Other Regulation
Not only do federal and state regulations affect "which" product and ser-
vice lines banking organizations may offer and "where" they may be con-
ducted, they also regulate "how" the banking organizations may conduct
their business. The range of regulation in this regard is too broad and de-
tailed to be described fully in this Article.82 Suffice it to say that provisions
have been implemented both at the state and federal level regarding diverse
elements of bank business such as lending limits," interaffiliate transac-
tions,84 investment authority, 85 capital requirements, 86 investments in bank
77. Id. § 1842(d).
78. Id.
79. In 1975, Maine became the first state to allow bank holding companies from other
states to acquire its banking institutions. See Richard, States' Interstate Banking Initiatives,
ECON. REV., Mar. 1985, at 21.
80. Id.
81. Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 176-78
(1985).
82. See generally Whiting, Bank Holding Companies, A Legal Primer, 2 BANKING L.
REP., May 1986, at 190.
83. See 12 U.S.C. § 84(a), (d) (1982).
84. Interaffiliate transactions are otherwise known as §§ 23A and 23B of the Federal Re-
serve Act. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 371(c), (e) (1982).
85. See 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
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premises, 87 and management interlocks.88 Further, numerous other laws
dealing with bank consumer protection have been enacted.8 9 Finally, the
federal and state bank regulators have been accorded broad powers to ex-
amine banks and their affiliates, require periodic reports, and enforce the
regulations under their jurisdiction.
II. GOALS OF BANK REGULATION
The number of laws administered by the three federal, and the fifty state,
bank regulators undoubtedly is in the thousands. Perusal of the preambles
of several major pieces of federal banking legislation reveals a multiplicity of
purposes: "to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting
commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the
United States";9° "to define bank holding companies, control their future
expansion and require divestment of their nonbanking interests";9  and "to
safeguard the consumer in connection with the utilization of credit." 92
These enumerated objectives have been neither consistent nor constant over
time. The statutory framework governing the banking industry was not pro-
duced at one time and does not reflect a comprehensive plan. Rather, the
regulatory scheme for the American bank system evolved ad hoc, more often
than not, in reaction to financial crises and political forces.
It is possible, however, to discern in these laws a pattern of purposes that
together comprise the fundamental goals of our nation's system of bank reg-
ulation. These goals are interdependent. It is helpful to articulate these
goals and to keep them in mind while considering revision of our banking
laws.
A. Depositor Protection
Banks perform many functions also performed by other entities: they are
a source of funds, offer certain financially related services, and provide a
place for capital investment. One function unshared with other entities,
however, is the holding of individual, corporate, and governmental funds
with the highest expectation of return of principal. The assurance of the
86. See E. SYMONS & J. WHITE, supra note 75, at 287-313.
87. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 29, 371(d) (1982).
88. See id. §§ 3201-3207.
89. See, e.g., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982 & Supp.
1986); The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1982).
90. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913).
91. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133.
92. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
19881
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safety of deposits, therefore, is a basic objective that bank regulation is
designed to achieve.
Many of our banking laws and regulations address this objective, and a
variety of approaches are taken. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act,93 for
example, simply insures the first $100,000 of a deposit account.94 Other
tacks are more subtle: some provisions place limitations on affiliation of
banks with companies that may expose bank depositors to increased risk;95
some place restrictions on the use of bank funds for particular purposes,
such as investments in real estate;96 some impose capital standards;97 and
others relate to disclosure of information regarding the bank's financial con-
dition, check-hold policies, and the like. 9a All of these provisions illustrate
that the goal of depositor protection pervades bank regulation. This goal
should not be misconstrued as the protection of individual banks. Clearly,
the system is not designed to ensure the viability of institutions that cannot
survive due to mismanagement or other undisciplined behavior.
B. Protection of the Financial System
The key role that banks play in the nation's payment system and in the
effectuation of monetary policy demands that the stability of the banking
system be maintained. Colloquially speaking, the health of the banking sys-
tem and the health of our country's economy go hand-in-hand. For this
reason, the federal government has provided a public safety net, consisting of
federal deposit insurance, access to the discount window, and use of the pay-
ments system, to the banking system.
Protection of the individual depositor may require a microeconomic ap-
proach, whereas protection of the financial system generally requires a
macroviewpoint. Sometimes the two are confused. Limitations on the affili-
ation of banks with commercial firms, for example, may be suggested by
those aiming to protect the individual depositor, as well as by those with an
interest in protecting the national payments system. How such limitations
are fashioned and implemented depends upon the goal to be accomplished.
C. An Efficient and Competitive Banking System
Many statutory provisions are intended to promote an efficient and com-
petitive banking system. The elements needed to achieve this goal are nu-
93. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1982).
94. Id. § 1813(m)(1).
95. See, e.g., National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 1841-1850 (1982).
96. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982).
97. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 225 app. A (1987).
98. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1982).
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merous and are not easily quantified. Basically, such a system provides
customers high-quality financial products and services at competitive prices.
Further, such a system also provides alternatives to the consumer. Addi-
tionally, an efficient and competitive system is flexible, so as to allow adapta-
tion to changing economic conditions.
Economic theory instructs that a free market is the optimum environment
for vigorous competition and that vigorous competition fosters improved
services, lower prices, higher quality, innovation, and greater efficiency.
Therefore, the major obstacle to efficiency in banking is excessive regulation.
Excessive regulation engenders the opposite. This theory has been whole-
heartedly embraced by the current administration.99 To the extent that a
regulatory system erects arbitrary barriers to entry, the objectives of an effi-
cient and competitive system are undermined. Such a system easily becomes
irrational and inequitable. Accordingly, considerable judgment is required
to fashion a banking system that achieves a balance between this goal and
the others previously described.
D. Consumer Protection
A goal of bank regulation, particularly manifest in several statutes
adopted since the mid-1970's, is the protection of consumers.'t° To a very
large degree, this goal is accomplished automatically in a competitive mar-
ket. That is, so long as the consumer has alternative sources of financial
services, any firm that engages in unacceptable consumer practices will be
punished by the marketplace and will not survive. This conclusion is widely
accepted by economists. Thus, an efficient and competitive financial system
operates in harmony with the goal of consumer protection.
While a healthy, competitive financial services market will inhibit and cor-
rect systemic consumer abuses, aberrations can still occur. With that in
mind, our regulatory system includes statutory consumer protection from
concrete abuses. 1o1 Also, several consumer laws attempt to minimize abuses
by providing for disclosure of information material to proposed financial
transactions, promoting equal treatment of all consumers, and applying their
restrictions to all providers of financial services.'o 2 That our banking system
has been amended to incorporate consumer protection is a sign of its
maturity.
99. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 142, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-
9 (1986).
100. See, e.g., The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1982); The Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1982); see also supra text accompanying note 89.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t, 1601-1667e.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1681-1681t, 1601-1667e.
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III. FORCES OF CHANGE
The banking industry now aggressively seeks revision of the statutory
scheme that governs the conduct of its business. In particular, those provi-
sions restricting the scope of product and service lines available to banking
organizations seem to be targeted for modification. Many factors motivate
this movement. So many changes have occurred since the laws governing
the banking industry were enacted that many laws no longer efficiently
achieve their intended goals. In fact, it is even widely accepted that certain
statutory provisions actually operate to undermine their stated objectives.
In order to understand the relationship between the existing bank regulatory
scheme and proposals to revise that scheme, it is important also to know the
incentives for change.
A. Compensation for Diminished Profit Opportunities
The quasi-public nature of banks often obscures the fact that they are pri-
vate corporations run for profit. The many statutory barriers to product and
geographic expansion naturally diminish their profit opportunities. While
these limitations originally were intended to further particular policy goals,
such as the containment of the amount of risk to which a bank is exposed,
they also reflect the context of the assumptions in which they were adopted.
Where those assumptions have radically changed, the limitations should be
reassessed.
For example, the activity restrictions contained in the Glass-Steagall Act
and the BHCA were adopted at a time when the limiting effects of those
restrictions on profits available to a banking organization were counterbal-
anced by governmental assurance of low-cost funds. 10 3 However, when
Congress adopted the Depository Deregulation and Monetary Control Act
of 1980,"° 4 which provided for the phase-out of all interest rate ceilings on
time deposits and ratified negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts
for consumers, the access of banks to low cost funds was lost. Consequently,
the quid pro quo for activity restrictions was removed and, in order to main-
103. There is a theory that when Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933 it repre-
sented a tradeoff of the banking industry's authority to engage in the securities business in
exchange for its banking franchise, consisting of low cost funds (deposits) and protection from
competition. See Application to Underwrite and Deal in Municipal Revenue Bonds, Mortgage
Related Securities, Consumer Related Securities and Commercial Paper: Hearings Relating to
Application by Citicorp, J.P. Morgan & Co., and Bankers Trust New York Corporation
Before the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (statement of James J. Baechele)
(Feb. 3, 1987).
104. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
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tain profitability, bankers have sought compensating deregulation of the as-
set side of their balance sheet.
B. Increased Competition
The role of banks as the provider of financial services has diminished sig-
nificantly in recent years. Concomitantly, nonbanks increasingly perform
bank-like functions. The consequences of these trends are negative both for
bankers and our nation, and have accelerated the need for change. Where
bankers can meet competition through opportunities available under existing
law, sometimes termed "exploiting the loopholes," they have done so. How-
ever, reasoned and comprehensive legislative action is the better method.
Bankers currently face competition from many sides and for many reasons
that were not significant at the time existing banking laws were enacted.
First, thrift institutions were accorded increased commercial lending1"5 and
NOW account authority"0 6 in 1980. Thus, even though thrifts and their
parents have substantially broader asset powers than banks, the public views
thrifts and banks as interchangeable, most likely because thrift deposits can
be federally insured and the legal distinctions from banks continue to blur.
The trend has disfavored banks because their annual asset growth rate has
been only 71/2% compared to 16% for thrifts. 0 7 Moreover, in this regard,
the unitary thrift holding company, a corporate structure wherein a com-
pany may own one thrift association and engage without limitation in all
other activities, continues to constitute a significant loophole in federal regu-
lation of insured depository affiliates and presents competition not easily met
by present bankers.
Second, unregulated nonbank entities, both financial and nonfinancial, in-
creasingly provide services similar to those available from banks. For exam-
ple, finance companies and insurance companies have become such active
lenders that they have displaced commercial banks as the major providers of
consumer installment credit.'08 The fact that captive automobile finance
companies are the three largest finance companies in the United States am-
ply demonstrates this trend.I0 9 Third, beginning in 1981, several commer-
105. See id. § 401, 94 Stat. at 151.
106. See id. § 303, 94 Stat. at 146.
107. See AMERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, EXPANDED PRODUCTS AND SERVICES FOR BANK-
ING: THE PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 9 (September 1986) [hereinafter EXPANDED
PRODUCTS].
108. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Recent Performance of the Commercial
Banking Industry, Summer 1986 N.Y.Q. REV. 3, 5-6 [hereinafter The Recent Performance].
109. FDIC, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: RESTRUCTURING THE BANKING INDUSTRY 9 (Oct.
1987) [hereinafter FDIC PLAN].
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cial companies acquired "nonbank banks""' in order to engage in many
aspects of the banking business at the same time that the parent company
escaped regulation under the BHCA."' Although, the provisions of title I
of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987112 prospectively prohibit
this strategy, approximately 200 institutions are grandfathered permanently
and may continue this advantageous arrangement.' 1
3
Fourth, the market share of commercial banking's portion of the whole-
sale commercial loan market has declined over the past several years; its
share of overall short-term commercial credit has slipped from over 43% in
1974 to approximately 27% in 1985.114 Much of this credit now is provided
to traditional bank corporate customers, who bypass the banks, by means of
the commercial paper markets."15 Additionally, advances in technology
drastically have cut the costs of information gathering, analysis, and trans-
mission, thereby permitting other bank customers to securitize their assets
and to fund them directly through the capital markets." 6 The accumulation
of large amounts of capital by institutional investors, i.e., pension funds, also
provides a ready alternative to banks as a source of credit." 17 Furthermore,
the increasing linkage of the world's financial markets allows the domestic
borrower, who heretofore would have borrowed from United States banks,
to obtain capital from foreign sources."18 Fifth, the liability side of the bal-
ance sheet also has experienced significant competition in the form of dis-
intermediation of bank deposits to money market and mutual funds.,"9
Lastly, foreign bankers have become more active in the United States, claim-
ing a proportionately larger share of domestic banking markets than in prior
years. 12
0
110. "Nonbank banks" are institutions chartered as banks, but which fail both to perform
commercial lending and to accept deposits payable upon demand. Accordingly, such "banks"
failed to meet the definition of "bank" for the purposes of the BHCA, before its amendment in
1987 by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987. Consequently, the parent of "non-
bank banks" escaped regulation pursuant to the BHCA. See The Recent Performance, supra
note 108, at 32-33.
111. Id.; see also P. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW 1-14 to 1-31 (2d
ed. 1987).
112. Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
113. See P. HELLER, supra note 111, at 4-81 to 4-92.
114. The Recent Performance, supra note 108, at 3.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. EXPANDED PRODUCTS, supra note 107, at 14-18.
120. Id. at 12.
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C. Need to Improve Bank Performance
The growing intensity of competition within the financial services market-
place has been accompanied by a decline in performance by the banking
industry. The FDIC recently reported that 16% of all banks were unprofita-
ble and that the earnings record and return on assets of commercial banks
for the second quarter of 1987 was the worst since 1934.121 Over 100 com-
mercial banks failed in 1986, and approximately 200 additional failures are
predicted for 1987.122 Furthermore, assessment of the future of banking, as
reflected by market valuation of bank stock, is discouraging: prices of bank
stock relative to their book value and to other industries are low.
123
It is difficult statistically to relate the decline in bank profitability to the
increasingly competitive environment. However, bankers are convinced that
structural barriers to bank expansion into additional product and service
lines have had a significant adverse effect on bank profitability and should be
reformed.
D. Need for System Rationalization
The bank regulatory system is ad hoc, overlapping, and confusing.124 Ad-
ditionally, it has been partially deregulated, not only by the affirmative legis-
lative action embodied in the 1980 legislation removing interest rate ceilings
on deposits, but by marketplace developments that creatively and aggres-
sively exploit its provisions. One point that illustrates this latter fact rather
well is the numerous types of securities activities that commercial banks con-
duct, despite the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act. For example, even
though the Glass-Steagall Act supposedly separates commercial from invest-
ment banking, commercial banks engage in: private placement of securities,
underwriting general obligation municipal bonds, full investment banking
activities in the Euromarkets, discount securities brokerage, limited under-
writing by subsidiaries not "engaged principally" in those activities, and
placement of third-party commercial paper. 125 A comparable listing of in-
surance practices conducted by banks and bank holding companies, despite
the provisions of title VI of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions
Act of 1982,126 also could be prepared. 127 While such exceptions to the gen-
eral barriers to bank product and service expansion provide a necessary out-
121. THE FDIC QUARTERLY BANKING PROFILE 1-3 (3d Qtr. 1987).
122. Id.
123. EXPANDED PRODUCTS, supra note 107, at 23-25.
124. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
125. R. Stem, The Glass-Steagall Anachronism: Market Forces Dictate Need for a
Change 9-14 (Dec. 18, 1986) (unpublished manuscript).
126. 12 U.S.C. § 226 (1982).
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let to bankers frustrated by those restrictions, they foster expensive and time
consuming inefficiencies in the form of litigation and lobbying efforts.12
Bankers believe that such efforts should be avoided and that Congress must
legislate comprehensive reform of the system.
E. Benefits for Other Industries
Statutory limitations on bank entry into other businesses have had unin-
tended adverse consequences in those industries. The structure of any mar-
ket reflects the vigor of competition within it. For example, the fact that
banking organizations have been precluded from full engagement in securi-
ties activities also has meant that the American consumer has been forced to
deal with oligopolistic and highly concentrated securities markets. In the
United States, the five largest underwriters of corporate debt control approx-
imately 69% of that market. 129 In the Euromarkets, where United States
banking organizations do compete in the underwriting of corporate debt, the
top underwriters hold only 49% of the market.13 ° Likewise, in the market
for underwriting municipal revenue bonds, where banks are excluded as
competitors, the top ten firms control about 57% of the market while in the
market for underwriting general obligation bonds, which banks do under-
write, the top ten firms hold only 31% of the market.13 1
The higher levels of concentration in markets from which banks are ex-
cluded undoubtedly translate not only into higher costs, but also into infer-
ior products, poorer service, and other inefficiencies. The oft-quoted
outrageous compensation packages paid to securities executives and the re-
ported flagrant abuses of Securities and Exchange Commission regulations
may be attributable to the lack of competition within the investment banking
industry. A similar scenario of concentration, lack of competition and
poorly served consumers resulting from lack of competition from bankers
arguably can be documented in the insurance industry. The need to address
all of the deleterious side effects of the existing structural framework pro-
vides one of the most compelling reasons for comprehensive restructuring of
our banking system.
127. See R. WHITING, BANK HOLDING COMPANY INSURANCE ACTIVITIES: CURRENT
PRACTICES AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES, 77-126 (1985).
128. See Whiting, New Path Needed for Financial Services Industry, Am. Banker, June 25,
1987, at 4, col. 1.
129. HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, MODERNIZATION OF THE FINAN-
CIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY: A PLAN FOR CAPITAL MOBILITY WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF
SAFE AND SOUND BANKING: H.R. REP. No. 324 (1987), 100 Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1987) [here-
inafter BARNARD REPORT].
130. Id. at 19.
131. Id.
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IV. RESTRUCTURING PROPOSALS
The forces for change now must be channeled into constructive action.
The logical options, it appears, are four-fold. First, no legislative action
could be taken-the so-called "muddle through" approach. Under this sce-
nario, the banking system would continue to be revised through marketplace
developments and agency and judicial actions. Second, legislative action
could be taken to regulate recent developments according to the principles
and standards embodied in existing statutes. This approach would consti-
tute an attempt to maintain the neat compartmentalization of the compo-
nents of financial services industry. Third, legislative action could be taken
to endorse a free-market approach. Such action would entail abandonment
of historical commitment to governmental regulation and result in wholesale
deregulation. Fourth, a middle approach could be taken. Such an approach
would attempt a thorough revision of the existing system. It would involve
careful evaluation of the extant provisions, keeping those that have worked
well. Such a scenario also would include enactment of new provisions that
address the changes that have occurred in the system and provide an accom-
modation for future adjustments. This last approach is the most logical and
the one advocated by the ABHC. There follows for reference, and for later
discussion, a description of that plan, together with several others.
A. ABHC Financial Service Holding Company Proposal
The most comprehensive restructuring proposal offered by the banking
industry in the last two years and, therefore, the one to which all subsequent
plans are compared, was developed by a national banking association, the
ABHC. The ABHC plan has been introduced by Representatives David
Dreier (R-Cal.) and Toby Roth (R-Wis.) in the form of H.R. 3360.132 The
concept has been endorsed by four other national banking trade associations:
the American Bankers Association,' 33 the Consumer Bankers Associa-
tion, 134 the Bank Capital Markets Association,' 3 5 and the Reserve City
Bankers Association.
136
132. H.R. 3360, 100 Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E3836 (1987).
133. The American Bankers Association is the largest national banking association repre-
senting 12,000 full service banks of all sizes and locations. Am. Banker, Oct. 20, 1987, at 28,
col. 1.
134. The Consumer Bankers Association represents 725 commercial banks, savings and
loans, savings banks, and credit unions. Its goal is the promotion of the retail banking indus-
try. Id.
135. Formerly the Dealer Bank Association, the Bank Capital Markets Association repre-
sents 175 banks involved in securities activities. Id.
136. The Reserve City Bankers Association's membership consists of approximately 400
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The ABHC concept provides for the creation of an umbrella corporation,
the financial services holding company, which would be defined by owner-
ship of a bank holding company and any other subsidiary engaged in "finan-
cially related" activities. 137 Such activities are limited to: (1) controlling a
savings and loan association; (2) underwriting and distributing securities;
(3) operating, sponsoring, and selling securities of an investment company;
(4) acting as an investment advisor; (5) engaging in the business of selling
and underwriting insurance; (6) engaging in real estate development and
brokerage; and (7) engaging in any activity permissible for a multiple savings
and loan association or a bank holding company.138 Each of the "financially
related" subsidiaries and the bank holding company would be functionally
regulated pursuant to the existing regulatory scheme: the parent corpora-
tion would not be regulated, but the Board would certify that each of its
subsidiaries is confined to "financially related" activities;' 39 that any bank
subsidiary is insulated from its affiliates pursuant to the provisions of sec-
tions 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act;" and that the parent corpo-
ration generally is not controlled by another company.14' Also, H.R. 3360
would provide national banks new, relatively riskless, nonbanking powers
(e.g., real estate, securities, and insurance brokerage) and expand existing
asset limitations on national bank investments in service corporations. 142 Fi-
nally, the ABHC proposal would empower the Board to receive periodic
reports from financial service holding companies and to enforce the specific
activity and insulation provisions of the proposed act. 14
B. Corrigan Proposal
On January 29, 1987, E. Gerald Corrigan, President of the Federal Re-
serve Bank of New York, released a publication entitled Financial Market
Structure: A Longer View, which also recommends a restructuring alterna-
tive for the financial system;' on November 20, 1983, Senators Wirth (D-
Colo.) and Graham (D-Fla.) introduced a bill, S. 1891, to implement this
executives from banks and bank holding companies. These companies hold substantial depos-
its from other banking organizations. Id.
137. H.R. 3360, supra note 132, § 2(c).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 2(d).
140. Id. § 2(e).
141. Id. § 2(f).
142. Id. §§ 9-10.
143. Id. § 7.
144. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK ANN. REP. (1987) [hereinafter CORRIGAN
PLAN].
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proposal. 145
The Corrigan proposal offers three holding company options to engage in
the financial services business. First, a bank or thrift holding company
would be defined by ownership of a depository institution. Such companies
could engage in a full range of financially related activities, including securi-
ties and insurance, and other services determined to be financially related by
a newly established "Financial Services Oversight Board." 146 Through the
depository institution subsidiaries, these holding companies could also offer
government insured deposits, including transaction deposits, and would have
direct access to the payments system and the discount window.147 These
companies could not be owned or controlled by nonfinancial companies or
engage in nonfinancial activities."' Their subsidiaries would be subject to
functional regulation by existing regulators, and the Board would have con-
solidated supervision over the parent organization. 1
49
Second, the proposal would authorize creation of a new type of holding
company called a "financial holding company."' 5 ° These holding compa-
nies could engage in financial services, but could not own any depository
institutions unless the parent chose to convert to a bank or thrift holding
company.15' These holding companies would be permitted full access to the
payments system and limited access to the discount window.'52 In return,
they would be subject to prudential supervision and could be subject to inter-
est-bearing liquidity reserves on transaction accounts offered to
customers. 153
Third, the proposal would permit "commercial" financial holding compa-
nies to combine general commerce and financial services, other than owner-
ship of a bank or thrift. These companies would receive no special assistance
from the government, such as direct access to the payments system or dis-
count window.' 5
4
Finally, in order to provide increased protection of the payments system, a
large dollar payments corporation would be created jointly between the Fed-
eral Reserve and the private sector.155 Bank and thrift holding companies
145. S. 1891, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S16,675-81 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1987).
146. CORRIGAN PLAN, supra note 144, at 40.
147. Id. at 41.
148. Id. at 40-41.
149. Id. at 43.
150. Id. at 39-40.
151. Id. at 39.
152. Id.
153. Id. 39-40.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 37.
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would be required to subscribe to this corporation, while financial holding
companies could choose whether to subscribe.
C. FDIC Plan
In October 1987, the FDIC published Mandate for Change: Restructuring
the Banking Industry.'"6 The study concluded that banks can be effectively
insulated from affiliates with relatively minor revisions to the existing statu-
tory framework.'5 7 In this regard, the FDIC would add restrictions gov-
erning dividend payments and general loan limits by banks, extend the
coverage of sections 23A and 23B to bank subsidiaries, and give the FDIC
authority to require reports as needed from nonbank affiliates. 158 Accom-
plishment of these steps, together with increasing the examiner and supervi-
sory staff of the FDIC, would permit the elimination of Glass-Steagall Act
restrictions on bank securities activities and the gradual phase-out of the
activity limitations and the provisions under the BHCA providing for super-
vision of the parent company.' 59 Thus, the FDIC concludes that banks may
be affiliated with any other business, commercial or financial, without need
of any holding company structure.
D. Barnard Proposal
On September 30, 1987, the House Committee on Government Opera-
tions submitted a report based on a study made by its Commerce, Consumer
and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee."' ° The report made specific recom-
mendations for a legislative framework for financial services holding compa-
nies. On December 18, 1987, Representative Doug Barnard (D-Ga.)
introduced a bill to implement these recommendations, H.R. 3799. 161
The Committee recommended a new and comprehensive scheme author-
izing the creation of financial services holding companies empowered to own
any insured depository, securities company, or other company engaged in
activities deemed by Congress to be of a "financial nature."'' 62 The Board
would be responsible for the interpretation of the phrase "financial nature."
The Board also would have general oversight over the parent company, but
would not have the authority to require applications for new activities or to
regulate the holding company, except to accomplish effective bank and thrift
156. See FDIC PLAN, supra note 109 and accompanying text.
157. Id. at 98.
158. Id. at 86-91.
159. Id at 100-01.
160. BARNARD REPORT, supra note 129.
161. See 133 CONG. REC. HI 1,865 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987) (statement of Rep. Barnard).
162. Id. at 74.
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insulation, as described below. 163 A financial services holding company
must be owned as a separate subsidiary, and any publicly owned financial or
commercial parent and all its affiliates would be functionally regulated." 64
The report recommends extensive statutory insulation of insured deposi-
tory institutions within the financial services holding company.' Such in-
sulation would prohibit all interaffiliate bank loans and any federal bail-out
of the holding company.' 66 The insulation program also would require rig-
orous capital standards for depository institutions, as set by the appropriate
regulator, company reimbursement of federal insurance funds for any losses,
legal separateness, cross-marketing free from coercive tie-ins and other un-
fair competitive practices. 67 While the Board would have no regulatory
power, it would be assigned responsibility for: monitoring and evaluating
the insulation scheme and conflict of interest controls; establishing, but not
enforcing, minimum capital adequacy ratios for the parent; analyzing the
aggregate stability of the financial system; prohibiting actions threatening
the legal separateness of depository institutions; and requiring reports and
disclosures to carry out these responsibilities. 168 Except as required to ac-
complish effective insulation, holding company oversight would be strictly
limited to prevent burdens upon nondepository subsidiaries that would ex-
ceed those applicable to their independent competitors.
E. Carper Bill
Representative Thomas Carper (R. Del.) has introduced a bill, H.R.
3063,169 that allows the states to lead the way to expanded bank powers.
This bill provides that, unless disapproved by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, a national bank may engage, through a separate subsidiary, in any
activity authorized for state chartered banks in the state in which the na-
tional bank is located.' 7 ° These bank subsidiaries would be subject to the
same antitying and section 23A lending restrictions that apply to other affili-
ates of the bank. Further, the activity may only be conducted in the state in
which the national bank is located, unless state law of the other state allows
the activity to be conducted by the national bank. 7'
The bill also provides that a bank holding company may control a non-
163. Id. at 74-75.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 79-81.
166. Id. at 79.
167. Id. at 81.
168. Id. at 78.
169. H.R. 3063, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
170. Id. § 3(b)(1).
171. Id. § 3(b)(6)(A).
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bank company engaged in any nonbanking activity, if the activity is author-
ized for state banks in the state in which the holding company has a bank
subsidiary."7 2 The activity must be conducted only in the state authorizing
the power, and in any other state that allows the activity to be conducted by
an out-of-state bank holding company.'7 3
Finally, the bill provides that, with appropriate regulatory approval, any
bank holding company or national bank may affiliate with a "qualified secur-
ities company."'174 The bill defines a "qualified securities company" as a
registered broker or dealer that may underwrite or deal in a limited range of
corporate securities representing pools of assets that the bank may origi-
nate. 17 It may also underwrite or deal in any security, provided such activi-
ties are conducted principally outside of the United States.
176
F. Double Umbrella Plan
An individual Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, H. Robert Heller,
has also developed a plan for the future framework of banking. 177 Pursuant
to this plan, the concept of the bank holding company would be expanded to
include not only bank, but thrift, insurance, investment, securities, and real
estate subsidiaries. 77 Thus, a full range of financial services would be avail-
able from the subsidiaries of one organization. These subsidiaries would be
functionally regulated and the parent company would be required to be a
"source of strength" to its banks, which would continue to have access to the
discount window and federal deposit insurance.1 79 However, strict limits on
the amount and nature of loans and other transactions between the bank and
all other subsidiaries and affiliates would be imposed.'
Under Governor Heller's plan, these newly authorized financial services
holding companies could be owned by any other firm, including commercial
corporations. 8 ' However, the parent company of a financial services hold-
ing company would also be required to serve as a source of financial strength
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 6.
175. Id. § 6(b).
176. Id.
177. See Address by Governor H. Robert Heller, The Shape of Banking in the 1990's,
Forecasters Club of New York (June 26, 1987). There currently are no proposed statutory
provisions to implement this plan.
178. Id. at 10.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 11.
181. Id.
[Vol. 37:347
Financial Services Restructuring
to its bank subsidiaries. '82 Thus, a "double umbrella" of protection for bank
subsidiaries would be imposed. No special regulation of the owner of a fi-
nancial services holding company is proposed.
G. "Safe" Bank Approach
Another alternative to bank restructuring is embodied in the concept of
the "limited," the "narrow," the "debanked," or the "safe" bank. This no-
tion is not new, tracing its origins to 100% reserve banking as discussed
several decades ago."' The most comprehensive description of modern-day
application of the concept is made by proponent Robert Litan in his recently
published book.' 84
Implementation of the "safe" bank approach would entail creation of an
optional new financial holding company, which could engage through sepa-
rate subsidiaries in any activity, financial or commercial, subject to certain
conditions.' First, its "bank" subsidiary would be confined only to ac-
cepting deposits and investing in highly liquid, high-quality securities.8 6
Second, all commercial and consumer lending would be restricted to a sepa-
rate lending subsidiary that funds itself through the capital markets.'8 7
Third, parents and affiliates of the bank subsidiary could not have deposit
accounts at their related banks.' This requirement would protect the in-
tegrity of the payments system. Fourth, any corporation, commercial or
not, could own the financial holding company.'8 9 Fifth, all current owners
of nonbank banks or unitary thrifts would be required to conform to the new
structure. For all others, the concept is voluntary.' 9° Sixth, no cross-selling
restrictions would be placed on the activities of the banks or their affili-
ates. 19 1 Seventh, the FDIC would define the kind of assets in which the
bank could invest and the Board would have only such authority over the
parent as to ensure the integrity of the payments system.'
92
182. Id. at 11-12.
183. See Mingo, Narrow Banks' Part of Restructuring Regulatory System, Am. Banker,
Sept. 15, 1987, at 5, col. 1.
184. R. LrrAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 164-78 (1987). Like the Heller approach,
supra note 177-82 and accompanying text, this plan has not been proposed in statutory form.
185. See R. LITAN, supra note 184, at 164-68.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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H. Financial Services Council Proposal
Several members of an affiliation of banking, financial, and commercial
firms, previously called the "Mayflower Group," have formed an organiza-
tion known as the Financial Services Council (FSC). The FSC has devel-
oped a comprehensive legislative proposal, the Depository Institution
Affiliation Act, that would allow any type of business to engage in banking,
insurance, thrift, securities, real estate, and other financial service activities
in compliance with a proposed framework.193 This scheme is contained in a
bill, S. 1905, that recently was introduced by Senators Cranston (D- Cal.)
and D'Amato (R-N.Y.).' 94
The FSC would create a new type of financial company, a "depository
institution holding company," which would be any company that controls
an insured financial institution and voluntarily has chosen to file a notice
that it intends to comply with the proposed new statutory framework.' 95 In
this last regard, the FSC would create a new governmental entity called the
"National Financial Services Committee," composed of all federal agencies
responsible for regulating financial institutions and entities. The Committee
would do several things: receive notices filed by proposed depository institu-
tion holding companies, provide a forum for all federal and state regulators
to reach a consensus regarding how the regulation of depository institutions
should evolve, provide a mechanism for developing responses to financial
crises, and file certain reports with Congress regarding future improvement
in the regulation and oversight of depository institutions.' 96
All of the subsidiaries of a depository holding company, including insured
depositories, would be subject to functional regulation. The existing federal
regulators would be granted enhanced powers to insulate affiliated deposi-
tory institutions, including greater and more flexible power over affiliate
transactions and additional enforcement authority, such as the ability to re-
quire prompt divestiture of any depository institution unable to maintain
applicable minimum capital requirements.' 97 Further, the proposed law
would subject depository institution holding companies to the tying and in-
sider lending restrictions now applicable to banks and would authorize in-
193. See Financial Services Council, Executive Summary of the "Depository Institution
Affiliation Act" (available in Finanical Services Council Library) [hereinafter Executive Sum-
mary]; Financial Services Council, Supplementary Background Information Concerning the
"Depository Institution Affiliation Act" (available in Financial Services Council Library)
[hereinafter Supplement].
194. S. 1905, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S16,857-64 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 1987).
195. See Executive Summary, supra note 193.
196. Id.
197. S. 1905, supra note 194, § 1010).
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creased criminal and civil penalties in the case of violation of the regulations
protecting the insured depository institution.198
I. Consumer Bank
Representative John J. LaFalce (D-N.Y.) has introduced a bill, H.R.
3209, also known as the Consumer Services Bank Act of 1987.199 The bill
provides that a national bank may become certified by the Comptroller of
the Currency as a "consumer services bank. '"2°' In order to receive such
certification, the bank must agree not to make commercial loans, to offer low
cost checking accounts, and to comply with several other consumer-related
requirements.2"'
As defined by the bill, a consumer services bank would not be a "bank"
under the BHCA.2°2 Thus, any company would be free to own or control
such a bank. However, the bank would be required to disclose in writing its
actions on behalf of an affiliate.203 As a further protection, it would also be
required to advise its customers that they are not required to purchase any
product or service from an affiliate in order to obtain credit or other financial
services from the bank.2' In addition, a consumer services bank could be
acquired by an existing bank holding company across state lines. However,
in any state in which a consumer services bank has a deposit-taking office, it
would be required to make consumer loans in that state equal to at least
sixty-five percent of the deposits received from residents of that state.205
J. ABA Bill
The nation's largest banking association, the American Bankers Associa-
tion (ABA), has caused the introduction in both houses of Congress of re-
lated bills, H.R. 50206 and S. 60,207 that would provide banks with
supplemental product and service authorization. 20 8 This bill is designed to
remove the "timid frittering" that has characterized the evolution of the fi-
198. Id. § 101(h)(1).
199. H.R. 3209, 100th Cong., Ist Sess., 133 CONG. REC. E3398 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987).
200. Id. § 3().
201. Id. § 5(a).
202. Id. § 7(a); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (defining bank as an institution that, in part,
engages in the business of making commercial loans); H.R. 3209, supra note 199, § 5(a)(l)
(consumer services bank cannot make commercial loans).
203. H.R. 3209, supra note 199, § 5(b)(3)(A).
204. Id. § 5(b)(3)(B).
205. Id. § 5(a)(5).
206. H.R. 50, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
207. S. 60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
208. S. 60 was introduced by Senator Gain. S.60, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC.
S150 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987).
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nancial system and open "discussion of moderization" and "serve as a cata-
lyst" for the resolution of the problems of our financial institutions."
The major provisions of the bill relate to new products and services for
banks and bank holding companies, as well as certain procedural changes.
For example, under H.R. 50, national banks could engage directly in insur-
ance agency or brokerage, realty brokerage, full service stock brokerage,
travel agency, and miscellaneous financial planning and clerical services. 21 °
The OCC would also have "leeway authority" to grant national banks pow-
ers commensurate with those of federal thrifts and state banks.2" Also, all
FDIC-insured banks could invest up to 3% of assets in a bank service corpo-
ration (BSC), and up to 15% in multiple BSC's. 21 2 BSC's would have the
same powers as national banks, plus insurance underwriting, real estate de-
velopment, and the underwriting and distribution of municipal revenue
bonds, mortgage-backed securities, commercial paper, mutual funds, corpo-
rate debt, and securities backed by any loan a bank could own.21 a Addition-
ally, a bank holding company could engage in the same activities listed
above as permitted to BSC's, either directly or through separate subsidiar-
ies. 2  They could also acquire thrifts, subject to the McFadden Act and the
Douglas Amendment. 2 5 Finally, H.R. 50 would provide for certain proce-
dural changes, such as expedited bank holding company formation proce-
dures, new notice procedures for bank holding company nonbanking
activities, and minimalization of duplicate regulation by the federal bank and
securities regulators.21 6
K. 1987 Senate Bill
Senator William Proxmire (D-Wis.), Chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee, has recently introduced a bill, S. 1886, for congressional consid-
eration. 27 This bill, entitled the "Proxmire Financial Modernization Act of
1987," would reconstitute the framework governing the combination of the
banking and securities business. The full Senate approved the bill on March
209. 133 CONG. REC. E47 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. Barnard).
210. H.R. 50, supra note 206, § 3(b).
211. Id. § 3(c).
212. Id. § 5(a).
213. Id. § 5.
214. Id. § 4(d).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. See Garson, Proxmire Unveils Draft Bill Permitting Affiliation of Banks, Securities
Firms, Am. Banker, Nov. 12, 1987, at 1, col. 2; S. 1886, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). Also, a
companion bill to S. 1886 has been introduced in the House by Rep. Stephen Neal. See H.R.
3800, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 CONG. REC. HI 1,865 (daily ed. Dec. 18, 1987).
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30, 1988 by a vote of ninety-four to two. The bill may provide the basis for
future discussion in conference with the House Banking Committee.
The bill would repeal sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act on a
phase-in basis and provide a framework under the BHCA by which bank
holding companies may engage a nonbanking subsidiary in underwriting,
distributing, and dealing in all types of securities.218 Under the bill, the
Board would approve applications to form a securities subsidiary under sec-
tion 4(c)(1 5) of the BHCA, based on the Board's judgment as to adequacy of
capital and managerial resources; bank holding companies that lacked ade-
quate resources could exercise the additional authority on a phased-in ba-
sis. 219 Once approved, the subsidiary could engage in all types of securities
underwriting and dealing, subject to numerous statutorily imposed restric-
tions. These restrictions would apply to interaffiliate transfers of informa-
tion and funds, prohibitions on interlocks, sharing of facilities and logos, and
restrictions on affiliate loans to purchasers or issuers of securities underwrit-
ten by the holding company securities affiliate.220
The bill also provides that bank holding companies with total assets of $30
billion or more would not be permitted to purchase an investment firm with
assets of $15 billion or more. 22 National banks would be permitted directly
to underwrite and distribute municipal revenue bonds, unit investment
trusts, United States government securities, and other securities.222 All
other securities activities would be required to be conducted in the affiliate.
Finally, the Securities and Exchange Commission would have jurisdiction
over the securities affiliate.223
L. Miscellaneous Plans
Although the preceding listing and discussion of proposed plans to
restructure the financial services industry is lengthy, it is not exhaustive.
For example, in testimony given in October 1987 before the Telecommunica-
tions and Finance Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Com-
mittee, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and Securities
and Exchange Commission Chairman David S. Ruder agreed to submit to
that subcommittee their blueprint for regulatory reform.224 Additional
218. S. 1886, supra note 217, § 101.
219. Id. § 102.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. § 108.
223. Id.
224. Testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, before the Subcommittee for Financial Institutions of the House Banking Committee
(Nov. 18, 1987).
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plans by other interested parties are in the process of formulation. Finally,
the House Banking Committee has held hearings on bank securities activities
and is expected to propose its own restructuring plan as late as March, 1988.
V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN PLANS
Each of the proposed restructuring plans summarized above reflects a seri-
ous, albeit different, approach to resolving the issues confronting the banking
component of the nation's financial services industry. All of the plans are
designed to accomplish the goals of bank regulation set forth earlier, but
each plan differs, depending upon the assumptions and policy choices made
during its formulation. Using the ABHC financial services holding company
concept as a basis for comparison, several, but not all, of the restructuring
proposals will be evaluated to determine their success in achieving the public
policy objectives of bank regulation.
A. Depositor Protection
The goal of depositor protection cannot be analyzed independently, but
frequently is linked to the other goals of bank regulation, particularly the
objective of a competitive banking system. Thus, most of the bank restruc-
turing plans seem to proceed from the premise that increasing the profitabil-
ity of the banking organization, while at the same time limiting the amount
of risk to which the bank is exposed, is the best means of ensuring the integ-
rity of bank deposits. Consequently, this approach involves the balancing of
an increased array of product and services lines that may be marketed to
supplement the banking organization's earnings against a range of possible
safeguards designed to mitigate the risks inherent in the affiliated business to
the deposit base.
1. Earnings Enhancement
The ABHC financial services holding company approach represents a sig-
nificant broadening of the range of permissible new product and service lines
that would be made available to bank affiliates. The scope of new "finan-
cially related" activities would add a nice diversity of product and service
lines to the banking organization, many of which would be profitable as well
as positively correlated to the earnings flow from existing banking func-
tions.225 These new activities also would complement many existing func-
tions currently conducted by banks and, therefore, promise increased
efficiencies and synergies.
225. See Wall & Eisenbeis, Risk Considerations in Deregulating Bank Activities, ECON.
REV., May 1984, at 6-19.
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The potential for increased earnings from the newly available product and
service lines for bank and thrift holding companies under the Corrigan pro-
posal, likewise, is limited to "financially related" activities.226 In this regard,
the Corrigan proposal offers earnings opportunities comparable to those of
the ABHC proposal. In contrast, the proposals by the FSC, the Barnard
subcommittee, and the FDIC all contemplate unlimited affiliation between
banks and other businesses, thereby providing unlimited possibilities for en-
hanced earnings. It should be noted, however, that the legal authority to
enter new businesses does not guarantee increased earnings; this result is
affected by many factors, including the organization's management abilities,
market competition, available capital and, particularly, the dampening effect
that governmentally imposed bank regulation, supervision, and insulation
may have on the overall operation of the organization.
a. Geographic Expansion
It is commonly accepted from an economic standpoint that geographic
diversification also provides earnings enhancement opportunities and con-
tributes to the protection of the deposit base of a banking organization.227
Yet none of these proposals attempts to address the concept of interstate
branching or interstate bank acquisitions. This, in part, reflects satisfaction
with the progress that has been made towards interstate banking through
state initiatives. However, the principal reason that no plan speaks to this
issue, other than to endorse existing statutory provisions, is concern that the
issue is too politically divisive of the banking industry and would undermine
attempts to procure product and service line diversification.
2. Safeguards
The two principal methods of safeguarding bank deposits from risks in-
herent in affiliated businesses are through the insulation of the bank deposits
from the other businesses and through the regulation and supervision of the
overall banking organization. It seems true that the degree of insulation and
the level of regulation and supervision are related to each other and, taken
together, may have an inversely proportional negative effect on the business
synergies of the component parts of the banking organization. That is, the
more regulation or supervision, the less insulation is needed. Furthermore,
the greater the amount of insulation or regulation, the less the value of the
relationship of the new product or service line to the efficiency of the overall
226. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
227. See Eisenbeis, Interstate Banking's Impact upon Financial System Risk, ECON. REV.,
Mar. 1985, at 31.
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banking organization. Each restructuring proposal contemplates a different
balance of these factors.
a. Insulation
Bank deposits may be insulated from affiliated business risks in three
ways: legal separation of the activities, economic insulation, and counteract-
ing the market perception of relatedness.22 The ABHC proposal achieves
legal separation and would require all banks to be indirectly owned by the
financial services holding company through a bank holding company subsid-
iary.229 This provision, in effect, provides double legal insulation. Similarly,
almost all the other proposals provide for the conduct of banking and non-
banking activities in separate subsidiaries with a distinct legal identity.
The ABHC concept provides for economic insulation by relying on ex-
isting provisions of statutory law such as: (1) the limits on interaffiliate loans
and other transactions, as provided in sections 23A and 23B, between the
bank and other entities within the financial services holding company struc-
ture; (2) the restrictions on dividends payable by a bank; and (3) the provi-
sions of the federal securities laws on antifraud and disclosure, which
prohibit a bank's affiliate from stating or implying that its obligations are
federally insured.230 The Corrigan plan similarly would rely on existing pro-
visions for economic insulation, but as discussed later, would supplement
this with consolidated supervision and regulation.2 31
Many of the other plans impose additional requirements on interaffiliate
relationships in order to achieve economic insulation. The FDIC plan is the
most stringent in this regard. The FDIC plan endorses sections 23A and
23B, and extends them to transactions between banks and the banks' non-
bank subsidiaries and affiliates.232 The FDIC also would require stronger
enforcement of the reinforced sections 23A and 23B, regulatory audits, and
disclosure of interaffiliate transactions. Similarly, the Barnard subcommittee
and the FSC place great emphasis on methods to increase the economic insu-
lation-the "R-Value"--of the bank component of their proposed financial
services holding company. Both of these plans, for instance, would grant the
primary bank regulator increased authority to promulgate and enforce regu-
228. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BANK POWERS: INSULATING BANKS
FROM THE POTENTIAL RISKS OF EXPANDED ACTIVITIES, REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM.
ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING, FI-
NANCE, AND URBAN AFFAIRS 12 (Apr. 1987).
229. H.R. 3360, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1987).
230. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
231. See supra text accompanying note 149.
232. See supra text accompanying note 158.
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lations regarding limitations on interaffiliate transactions.2 a3 Delegating this
authority to the regulators, rather than embedding it in statutory law, is
designed to provide for future flexibility.
Assuring the marketplace perception that bank deposits are insulated
from related businesses is not an overt objective of the ABHC plan. Perhaps
because the members of the ABHC have lived with the "holding company as
a source-of-strength" doctrine,2 34 they believe that the marketplace already
understands that the bank, in fact, is protected from the risks undertaken by
affiliates. Similarly, the Corrigan plan does not address this issue, primarily
because it has concluded that any financial holding company would be oper-
ated and perceived as a common enterprise except where the bank could be
so insulated from its parent and affiliates as to make it purely a passive, and
therefore undesirable, investment.
In contrast, most of the other major plans take affirmative steps to assure
the market perception of insulation of the bank's deposits from affiliated
businesses. The FDIC, Barnard, and FSC plans all would choose from a
menu of tactics to achieve this market perception. Among the tools sug-
gested to accomplish this type of insulation are: (1) the bear-down provi-
sions, contained in the Barnard and FSC plans, requiring divestiture of the
bank where the owner failed to meet regulatory capital requirements; (2) the
back-stop provision, requiring each parent in the corporate chain to assume
unlimited liability for its subsidiaries; and (3) the antibail-out provision, con-
tained in the Barnard plan, prohibiting federal bail-out of the holding com-
pany and requiring holding company reimbursement for any losses to the
federal deposit insurance funds.
b. Regulation and Supervision
All of the restructuring plans are premised either explicitly or implicitly
upon the assumption that inadequacies in the wall insulating bank deposits
from affiliate risk can be compensated for by increased regulatory or supervi-
sory oversight. The ABHC plan reflects a reasonable degree of comfort with
its proposed insulating wall and articulates a preference for supervision over
regulation. Thus, viewing arbitrary and burdensome regulations as counter-
productive to the efficient operation of a financial services holding company,
the ABHC plan advocates that less regulation does not necessarily mean less
supervision. Consequently, the ABHC plan proposes functional supervision
of all the bank and nonbank components of its financial services holding
company pursuant to extant regulatory provisions, and does not propose any
233. See supra text accompanying notes 168, 196, and 198.
234. See 52 Fed. Reg. 15,707 (1987).
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regulatory scheme for the consolidated holding company.235 In this regard,
the Board is accorded essentially minimal supervisory duties: to certify that
the company engages only in financially related activities, to ensure the insu-
lation of the subsidiaries pursuant to sections 23A and 23B, and to verify
that the company is not owned or controlled impermissibly.
While not assigning general oversight responsibilities to any regulator, the
Barnard study, the FSC, and the FDIC subscribe to the idea that increased
supervision is the proper way to address any increased risks associated with
their plan. In fact, it is worth noting that the FDIC was particularly em-
phatic on this point. It stated: "In summary, a supervisory safety and
soundness wall can be built around banks that will allow their owners, sub-
sidiaries and affiliates freedom to operate in the market place without undue
regulatory interference." '236 This conclusion by the federal insurer of depos-
its is especially helpful in determining the balance necessary to protect bank
deposits.
c. Separation of Banking and Commerce
The separation of banking and commerce is in reality the ultimate regula-
tory tool and rightly is part of the preceding section. However, because it is
such a fundamental and divisive issue,237 it merits separate discussion.
The ABHC and the Corrigan proposals alone establish a line separating
banking and commerce. Hence, a commercial firm cannot own or control a
financial services holding company, such as a bank's parent, under either
concept. The ABHC position in this regard is practical. The ideology of the
separation of banking and commerce, while maybe not a historical fact, is a
political reality. The ABHC, therefore, chooses not to enter this controver-
sial area. In this regard, Corrigan believes that the combination of banking
and commerce is not common in world markets, introduces unacceptable
risks into the banking system, and should be permitted only upon the show-
ing of compelling public policy reasons. The other major plans, however,
postulate that any corporation, financial or commercial, should be permitted
to own a bank and that any incremental risks can be managed through in-
creased supervision or insulation.
235. Structure and Regulation of Financial Firms and Holding Companies.- Hearings
Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. for Government Operations, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1986).
236. FDIC PLAN, supra note 109, at 102.
237. Contrast, for example, the position put forward in The Separation of Banking and
Commerce in American Banking History. Hearings on the Structure and Regulation of Finan-
cial Firms and Holding Companies Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Opera-
tions, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 393 (1986), to SEARS, ROEBUCK & Co., FINANCIAL SERVICES:
CONSUMERS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE (Nov. 1985).
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B. Protection of the Financial System
All of the safeguards described in the preceding section indirectly and gen-
erally protect the financial system. They accomplish this goal by diminish-
ing the risks associated with the activities of bank affiliates. Except for the
Corrigan proposal, however, none of the major restructuring plans specifi-
cally provides for the protection of the three primary components of the
federal "safety net": the payments system, the large dollar payments mecha-
nism, or the federal deposit insurance fund.
The Corrigan proposal creates a framework with substantial involvement
by the Federal Reserve System. The other principal proposals do not di-
rectly address the topic, holding that access to, and the liabilities of, the
safety net may be limited, not by complete restructuring, but by proper ad-
ministration of the existing scheme. For example, the ABHC has stated
that, as a matter of safety and soundness, bank regulators should fashion
restrictions on the availability of the safety net. Similarly, the FDIC has
suggested that the Board exercise existing authority to restrict institutions
from running overdrafts and require that overdrafts be fully collateralized.
Furthermore, the Barnard Committee recommends that operational changes
to the network be considered, but that the payments system risk is not rele-
vant to the issue of expanded product and service authority.
C. An Efficient and Competitive Banking System
More than any other factor in the formula for a successful financial ser-
vices system, the goal of efficiency and competitiveness is counterbalanced
against the safety and soundness considerations previously discussed. A
100% riskless system will lack the benefits that flow from efficiency and
competition; an absolutely unfettered system in terms of competitive re-
straints likely will result in an intolerable amount of risk. Each of the pro-
posed restructuring plans adopts varying approaches to achieve this goal.
The ABHC proposal provides for expanded competitive opportunity by
permitting reciprocal and equal entry by the banking, thrift, securities, insur-
ance, and real estate industries into each others' business. Arbitrary, exces-
sive, and protectionist barriers, such as the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall
Act, between the industries and the insurance provisions of section 4(c)(8) of
the BHCA, would be eliminated. Thus, a rational and "level playing field"
is established for all participants within the defined area of financial services.
This perhaps is the most distinguishing feature of the ABHC plan. It would
facilitate the mobility of the capital and management resources necessary for
fuller competition and greater efficiency.
Additionally, the ABHC plan provides various options for competitor
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firms to implement their strategic plans. They may maintain their opera-
tions unchanged, thereby continuing to serve their market niche, or they
may expand to whatever level of competition within the financial services
marketplace they choose. Also, this feature of the ABHC plan allows for the
efficiencies and competitive benefits that flow from dealing with different reg-
ulatory schemes. Finally, the ABHC plan does not impose such severe insu-
lation and regulatory requirements as to destroy the inherent synergies
between financial product and service lines.
The Corrigan proposal is similar to the ABHC plan in that it significantly
expands the competitive opportunities of the financial services industry, in-
corporates a concept of volunteerism and contains minimal insulation re-
quirements.2 38 The aspect of the Corrigan proposal most open to criticism,
however, is its imposition of Federal Reserve System oversight on the parent
bank or thrift holding company. The Board's administration of comparable
responsibilities under the BHCA has demonstrated that its implementation
of the application, supervision, and examination processes has significantly
impaired the achievement of competitive and efficiency goals within the
banking industry; it is easy to forecast the same result under the Corrigan
plan.
The Barnard and FSC plans are alike in that they allow unlimited compet-
itive opportunities in the ownership of banks. They also do not subject cor-
porate bank owners to regulation and impose relatively limited insulation
requirements on bank affiliates.
D. Consumer Protection
Protection of the consumer is already an express goal of many existing
statutory provisions. It appears that each of the restructuring proposals as-
sumes that the protections provided in those laws would be adequate in the
context of any restructured financial services industries scheme, that these
protections should be extended to customers of the financial services com-
pany, or that incremental adjustments should be made by the regulators as
future developments warrant. The Barfard plan, however, stipulates that
cross-marketing restrictions should not be imposed on the components of a
financial services holding company. In general, it may be concluded that the
drafters of the major restructuring plans believe that consumer protection
will flow naturally from a competitive marketplace, and are willing to accept
imposition of additional and reasonable consumer protections upon a dem-
onstration of their need.
238. See Corrigan, A Framework for Reform of the Financial System, 12 FED. RESERVE
BANK N.Y.Q. REV. 5 (1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The commitment undertaken by Congress in title II of the Competitive
Banking Equality Act of 1987 to review our financial services structure has
initiated a national discussion. There is a consensus of opinion on certain
issues. First, there is unanimity regarding the conclusion that the core busi-
ness of traditional banking is deteriorating. Second, there is agreement that
other industries now provide bank-like functions without complying with
the regulations applicable to banks. Third, there is a concession that banks
are "special" either as a matter of fact or politics. Fourth, there is wide-
spread agreement that comprehensive legislative changes to the current stat-
utory and regulatory framework governing the banking and the financial
services industry must be effected. Finally, most commentators understand
that any revision of the laws applicable to banking must strike a balance
between the competing and interrelated public interest goals of deposit pro-
tection, the safety and soundness of the banking system, a competitive and
efficient banking system, and consumer protection.
This Article has described and discussed several financial services restruc-
turing proposals that further the national debate. Each represents a legiti-
mate attempt to achieve the balance of public policy considerations so often
alluded to herein. Deciding which is the best proposal is a matter of judg-
ment on several fronts: legal, political, and practical. As a matter of per-
sonal and professional judgment, the author acknowledges his obvious bias
that the financial services holding company concept developed by the ABHC
constitutes an eminently reasonable and appropriate solution to the issues
confronting Congress. In part, this conclusion results because the ABHC
plan represents a compromise to the Corrigan and the FSC plans.
No one expects or believes that Congress will enact a comprehensive re-
structuring plan upon the expiration of the bank products and services mor-
atorium on March 1, 1988. It is hoped, however, that Congress will have
moved considerably down the road toward establishing the balance of public
interest factors needed as the foundation to any plan. In this regard, Con-
gress must keep several additional principles in mind. The plan Congress
ultimately implements should reflect a resolution of substantive concerns
and not a deference to industry interests. Any plan should rise above the
volume of political action committee and industry campaign contributions
and avoid arbitrary and protectionist tendencies. To the extent possible,
Congress should permit the marketplace to fashion the regulatory structure.
Where governmental discipline is needed, increased supervision and disclo-
sure should be preferred to overt prohibitions.
The plan eventually adopted should build upon portions of the existing
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system that have worked well. Unnecessary tinkering should be avoided.
Furthermore, Congress should examine experiences in this country and
overseas in order to predict the results of any proposed restructuring actions.
For example, Congress should study the combination of banking and insur-
ance, or banking and securities, where it exists in the United States and
abroad, to determine the effects this combination has had on competition,
depositor and system risk, and the consumer. Congress also would be wise
to avoid the temptation to delegate its authority to administer the banking
system to one central authority. This policy would eliminate the flexibility
found in our current diversified system and tend to destabilize the system as
a whole when that central regulator errs. Closely linked to this advice, Con-
gress should design a system with a safety valve-one that induces change
gradually and can be reversed to avoid permanent negative results. Finally,
and most importantly, Congress should attempt to break its habit of dealing
with banking and financial issues. In this respect, Congress historically has
been reactive-responding to crises in the banking industry by enacting nar-
row, remedial action. Instead, Congress should consider all options and pos-
itively act in fashioning a new financial services structure. The nation
deserves deliberate and forward thinking on this important topic.
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